Recently in the Sentencing - General category:
The New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers recently published its winter edition of
Atticus, showcasing the two impressive honorees at the upcoming annual dinner of the NYSACDL
Foundation, Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman and David Ruhnke, Esq. In it, I also have an article addressing
three recent Second Circuit decisions of note: United
States v. Banki (reach of a regulatory crime narrowed under the rule
of lenity); United States v. Lee (government abused
its authority when it withheld a third “acceptance of responsibility” point
because the defendant had challenged errors in his presentence report); and United States v. Rivera (ameliorating “shameful
inequalities” of crack-cocaine disparity by applying the rule of lenity to an
ambiguous sentencing guideline). It is
available here.
The NYSACDL Foundation’s annual dinner is this Thursday, January 26, at
the Prince George Ballroom. If last
year’s elegantly fast-paced event is anything to go by, this will be a
memorable celebration of two champions of criminal defendants’ rights and
indigent defendants in particular, and the
Finally, a belated Happy New Year to my loyal readers from
snowy
Facts
Preacely pled guilty to crack distribution under a cooperation agreement and was released on bail. Between arrest and sentencing, he underwent “exceptional rehabilitation,” overcoming a daily marijuana habit, participating in pro-active cooperation leading to “several successful criminal investigations,” completing two work training programs, and “dramatically transform[ing] his personal life” through marriage, parenting and becoming a youth advisor for the Nassau DA’s gang prevention program.
Preacely’s presentence report determined that he was a “Career Offender” as defined under the Sentencing Guidelines, a category that resulted in a dramatic bump both of his offense level and criminal history category. His applicable guideline was therefore 188-235 months in custody. Rejecting defense counsel’s request for a sentence of time-served (about two years), EDNY Judge Platt noted repeatedly that he could not ignore the fact that he was dealing with a “Category VI” offender (the category to which career offenders are automatically assigned), and imposed a sentence of 94 months, exactly half of the low end of the recommended guideline range.
Holding
In a decision written by Ninth Circuit Judge Wallace (sitting by designation), the Court held that it was unclear from Judge Platt’s repeated emphasis of Preacely’s status as a Category VI career offender that he understood he was free to reject the career offender classification entirely. Evidence of Preacely’s rehabilitation was “particularly relevant to determining whether the Career Offender Guideline was appropriate,” but Judge Platt’s statement that he was “dealing with a Category VI career offender, regardless of all of what you said,” “reinforce[d] [the Court’s] doubt that the district judge fully understood his authority to depart from Category VI if it significantly over-represented the seriousness of Preacely’s criminal history and/or the likelihood that he will commit further crimes.” Accordingly, the Court remanded so that Judge Platt could consider that option.
Judge Lynch’s Concurrence
Adding his “common-sense” explanation for the decision, Judge Lynch described the career offender guideline as “a simplistic three-strikes policy,” which in Preacely’s case was “distinctly inflated” and “remarkably severe.” Premised on the likelihood that someone in that category “presents an extreme danger of committing more crimes,” it may not be the appropriate baseline for someone, like Preacely, who “had reformed, and no longer present[s] such a danger.” While the district court was not required to accept Preacely’s claims of reform, “[it] was required to consider those claims” and not simply to assume that he was dangerous based on his classification as a Category VI offender. Judge Lynch adds:
[I]t is extremely useful to give separate consideration to that aspect of the cooperation departure that operates as a pure reward to induce testimony, regardless of the defendant’s character, and the quite separate basis for mitigation that relates to a defendant’s potential reformation (which might be evidenced in part by his cooperation with the authorities).
Judge Raggi’s Dissent
In a dissenting decision, Judge Raggi took issue with the majority’s conclusion that Judge Platt may have misunderstood his power to depart from the career offender guideline, pointing out that he acknowledged on the record that he could depart as far down as a non-custodial sentence. Even if the majority was correct that there was some ambiguity on that score, she proposed that “the proper action would be to remand for clarification, not to vacate and order resentencing.”
Comment
As the authors point out in the excellent “Deconstructing the Career Offender Guideline” (and citing the Sentencing Commission’s own research), “[s]entences recommended by the career offender guideline are among the most severe and least likely to promote sentencing purposes in the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual.” Preacely places that harshness in a stark light – relatively minor convictions catapulted him into the category, while his stunning post-arrest transformation established that he clearly did not belong among the incorrigible offenders for whom the category was written. Indeed, the subtext of the majority’s opinions in Preacely is that his sentence – cruelly returning a newly-productive individual back to prison for at least another five years – was substantively unreasonable. Preacely is therefore an important case not just on the power to depart from the career offender guideline, but the duty to depart from it where the defendant has presented compelling evidence that it should not apply to him. More generally, the case is an important precedent on a sentencing judge’s obligation to consider a defendant’s post-offense rehabilitation efforts, and, in cases involving cooperation, to give additional credit for that aspect of cooperation that reflects the defendant’s actual or potential reformation.
Lawyers: Yuanchung Lee (Federal Defenders of New York, Inc.); AUSA Thomas Sullivan and Susan Corkery
Facts
The defendant, an admitted child molester, pled guilty to distributing child pornography. He faced a guideline range of 235-240 months. In sentencing him to 132 months, the district court relied in part on a psychological report of the defendant that concluded he was not a danger to the community. The report had been prepared for use at a pretrial bail hearing, and premised its dangerousness findings on the fact that any pretrial release would be into the defendant’s parents’ custody. The government appealed.
Holding
The Second Circuit agreed with the government that the district court had committed procedural error when it relied on the report “in so far as it entirely removed [the psychologist’s] opinion from the context in which it was rendered.” In particular, the Court noted that the report at issue “was conditioned on the premise that DeSilva would be released to his parents,’ and therefore was only of “minimal relevance” on the issue of his potential to molest children following his release from his term of imprisonment, when parental monitoring would not be on the cards.
Notably, the Court had this to say about psychological reports in general:
CommentAlthough a psychologist’s report may provide mitigating evidence for the court’s consideration during sentencing, the court must still conduct an independent evaluation of the defendant in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). If the psychologist’s report cannot be squared with the court’s own judgment of the defendant’s culpability and the danger he poses to society, the court is free, in its discretion, to decline to rely on the psychologist’s findings, so long as the court explains its basis for doing so.
In appropriate cases, psychological reports of the defendant can have a significant mitigating effect at sentencing – humanizing him in a way that the presentence report does not, elucidating his offense behavior in the context of his unique emotional and psychological deficits, and giving the sentencing judge security (and cover) in rejecting the applicable advisory guideline range. DeSilva reaffirms all of the above, with the simple and elementary caveat that if a psychological report is to be used at sentencing, it should not be recycled from another source, but should be tailored directly to the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553.
In Dorvee, the Court reached the rare conclusion that a sentence was substantively unreasonable (a 240-month sentence, to be exact), citing in part the “serious flaws” in the child pornography guideline. Like the crack guideline at issue in Kimbrough, the child pornography guideline yields harsh and iniquitous results, not because of any empirical analysis, but solely as a result of Congressional directives. In words that apply far beyond the guideline at issue here, the Court reminds us that Sentencing Commission is just a fallible government agency, and whether its pronouncements are entitled to respect should be determined on a case-by-case basis:
This deference [sentencing judges must pay] to the Guidelines is not absolute or even controlling; rather, like our review of many agency determinations, “[t]he weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” On a case-by-case basis, courts are to consider the “specialized experience and broader investigations and information available to the agency” as it compares to their own technical or other expertise at sentencing and, on that basis, determine the weight owed to the Commission’s Guidelines. (citations omitted)
Comment
In its conclusion, the Court would appear to limit this decision to the peculiar flaws in the child pornography guideline – “an eccentric Guideline of highly unusual provenance” – but as the Federal Defenders establish in their Deconstructing the Guidelines project, every guideline has the potential to be viewed as an “eccentric” one “of highly unusual provenance” if you just take the trouble to peel the layers of amendments away, and put its origin under a microscope. Dorvee is also further proof, as my colleague Harlan Protass has argued at the Second Circuit Sentencing Blog, of the blurring between procedural and substantive review of sentences.
Lawyers: Paul J. Angioletti, Esq. (defendant); AUSAs Paul D. Silver, Thomas Spina, Jr., Paul Ryan Conan, and Brenda K. Sannes
Making a formal pact with federal prosecutors has many advantages, as demonstrated in United States v. Menendez, 2010 WL 1172076 (2d Cir. March 29, 2010). The appellant (Sierra) had pled guilty without a plea agreement to an indictment charging him with heroin distribution and money laundering. He challenged his sentence of 135 months in part on the grounds that the district court created an unwarranted disparity in sentencing by imposing upon him a longer term of imprisonment than on each of his several co-defendants, who, he argued, played the same or a larger role in the criminal scheme. (This argument was not raised at the district court level, and so was reviewed on a plain error analysis.) Rejecting the claim, the Court explained:
Although it is true that a district court may compare co-defendants' sentences to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, the sentencing disparities between Sierra and his co-defendants were not unwarranted in this case. Unlike Sierra, his co-defendants either (1) pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, (2) pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute heroin or narcotics but not to conspiracy to launder money, (3) pleaded guilty to conspiracy to launder money but not to conspiracy to distribute, or (4) were exceptionally honest in admitting to the crimes, and brought to the court's attention unique facts, such as HIV-positive status and a resulting reduced risk of recidivism. On plain error review, we therefore reject Sierra's unwarranted-disparity argument as without merit.
In the same case, the Court ruled as a matter of first impression that the base offense level for Sierra's conviction for conspiracy to launder narcotics proceeds could be calculated using the greater amount of drugs involved in the underlying offense of conspiracy to distribute heroin.
Lawyers: Randa Maher, Esq. (defendant); AUSAs Sarah Lai and Guy Petrillo.
At sentencing, a defendant's most personal and intimate experiences may be discussed and analyzed. The public has a presumptive right of access to these proceedings, and where, as in United States v. Doe, 2009 WL 4823001 (2d Cir. December 14, 2009), the defendant "seeks to seal the record of the criminal proceedings totally and permanently, the burden [to overcome that presumption] is heavy indeed."
In fact in Doe, both the defendant and the government sought the permanent sealing order based on the existence of an undisclosed "compelling interest subject to a substantial risk of prejudice." The Court accordingly appointed amicus curiae to defend the district court's order denying the application.
Although it held that total and permanent sealing was unjustified, the Court noted that "it may be possible to protect the 'compelling interest' at issue here by sealing the sentencing transcipt in a way that is less than total and permanent. It therefore remanded the case "to afford the parties an opportunity to apply for a sealing of the sentencing transcript that is partial, non-permanent, or both."
Lawyers: Lee Dunst, Anne Chamption, Daniel Chirlin, Brian Mogck, Aaron Simowitz, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (amicus curiae); AUSAs Elizabeth Kramer, Peter Norling, Jo Ann Navickas
See Archives for all posts since September 2007.
